



                      
(i)
This essay will trace a certain argumentative thread within Pierre Duhem's
philosophy of science that does not seem to have attracted much notice heretofore,
yet helps greatly to motivate the anti-realist conclusions for which he is often cited. 
Most contemporary readings of Duhem trace his anti-realism largely to his
celebrated articulation of what is now known as the "Quine-Duhem Thesis": the
claim that any cherished hypothesis H can be protected against empirical
disconfirmation through blaming some other hypothesis H' utilized in its
problematic applications.  Indeed, Duhem sometimes writes as if simple modus
tollens was sufficient to establish this fact: 
       (H & H') e E 
             -E      
         -H v -H' 
Yet, surely, this innocuous logical observation can’t adequately support Duhem's
quite sweeping claims that the choice of a physical ontology must represent, in the
final analysis, a matter of metaphysics rather than physics proper.  But it is
precisely these strong philosophical contentions that inspire the modern anti-
realists who frequently evoke Duhem for intellectual support.  2
However, if we inspect, not The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, but
Duhem's prior and more technical work, The Evolution of Mechanics, we will
discover that Duhem also believed he had established the far stronger thesis that is
today entitled "the observational underdetermination of theory": the notion that two
or more completely distinct theories can organize all possible observational
evidence with equal adequacy.  And Duhem believed that he could demonstrate
this claim by a concrete example.  He wrote: 
Whatever may be the form of the mathematical laws to which
experimental inference subjects physical phenomena, it is always
permissible to pretend that these phenomena are the effects of
motions, perceptible or hidden, subject to the dynamics of Lagrange.3
Unfortunately, as in much of his writings, Duhem does not explain what he means
by this remark as pellucidly as he might.  The chief objective of this note is to
supply a crisp reading for what he seems to have in mind.
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It would be a matter of great interest for contemporary philosophy of science
if this claim could be fully maintained.  That distinct theories exist which are
observationally equivalent in some strong sense is a doctrine to which many
philosophers cling passionately but, arguably, represents a thesis for which no
indisputably sound examples have yet been proposed.  Most proposed cases of
which I am aware either turn upon some misunderstanding of the relevant physics
or involve factors that should seem innocuous to the average scientific realist.
Many philosophers of the logical empiricist era--W.V. Quine representing a prime
example--endorse the undetermination thesis in the absence of concrete
illustrations largely because they believe that any collection of "observational
consequences" can be supplemented in many ways by inequivalent extensions. But
a “theory” is just such a logical extension, hence underdetermination follows. But
many of us today feel that this logic-based defense of undetermination relies upon
a totally unsuitable picture of how real life theories produce their "observational
consequences."   It would be far preferable if defenders of the claim could produce
some genuinely convincing examples.  Without attempting to evaluate the merits
of other contenders here, I will simply state that Duhem's suggested pair of
allegedly observationally theories represents as good an illustration of the expected
behavior as I have encountered.4
We will find as we work through the details, however, that a key step in
Duhem’s reasoning seems to rely upon a tacit assumption that a policy of essential
idealization must be applied in setting up the equations for a continuous physical
system property.  In particular, Duhem presumed--and this assumption would have
been widely shared in the physics community of his day (and by many within our
own times as well)--that one must intentionally misdescribe matter’s qualities at a
small size scale to permit the application of Newton’s laws and allied forms of
mechanical principle.  Smallish flexible or fluid elements within a continuous body
must be falsely approached as if they were more rigid than they truly are.  Such
assumptions trace to some quite tricky problems concerning the specific kind of
physical infinitesimals that are natural in mechanics.  But let me stress that, in the
phrase "physical infinitesimals", I have in mind some quite specific problems that
arise when one sets up the equations for some continuously distributed system. 
These issues persist no matter how the mathematical infinitesimals native to the
real line are treated, whether in the now standard Cauchy/Weierstrass manner,
Robinson-style infinitesimals or some kindred point of view.  The issues we must
face are primarily ones of physics, not mathematics.   Eventually, twentieth century
research on continua decided that the problems posed by these “physical
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infinitesimals” must be approached in a considerably more sophisticated manner
and that Victorian appeals to “essential idealization” represented a crude means for
bypassing some rather complex methodological issues (these modern innovations
were not driven by a desire to simply “clean up” the old work, but because no
progress could be made with respect to more complex physical systems unless the
old problems were more squarely addressed).  In essence, by freely evoking
“essential idealization” themes, physicists of Duhem’s era had been employing
anti-realist philosophizing to perform tasks that modern practitioners believe
properly require more sophisticated forms of applied mathematics.  
With the loss of the essential idealization thesis, Duhem’s underdermination
example collapses--his indistinguishable rivals become palpably distinguishable
once again.  Nonetheless, a thorough investigation of the entire enterprise reveals a
lot about the history of how strong anti-realist themes crept into the philosophy of
science (contrary to what one might expect, they were firmly formed long before
the oddities of quantum mechanics came along).  The purpose of this essay is to
further our understanding of this historical genesis. 
(ii)
To unpack both Duhem’s underdetermination example and the rationale for
essential idealization, we must review some of the competing views of matter that
were actively debated during the classical era.  Duhem himself hoped that what we
now call "classical phenomena" could be organized in a fashion that regards matter
as inherently continuous media--i.e., continuously distributed hunks of connected
stuff.   He also maintained that thermodynamic notions like quantity of heat and
internal energy should enter physics as primitive notions coequal with mechanical
concepts like momentum and kinetic energy.  This thermomechanical framework
should be sharply contrasted with the approach now offered in most modern texts
on "classical mechanics" designed for physicists , which instead treat matter as5
composed, at its root, of swarms of isolated point masses bonded only through
action at a distance forces.  Here heat and internal energy are expected to derive
statistically from more basic mechanical concepts.  The point mass approach was
originally suggested by S.J. Boscovich and was pursued, with varying degrees of
loyalty, by the French "physical atomists" who worked near the beginnings of the
nineteenth century.  Strikingly enough, Duhem simply dismisses the Boscovichean
approach as empirically unsound, for the standard late nineteenth century reasons
(e.g., one obtains the wrong number of constants in Navier's equations for an
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elastic solid).  When Duhem writes of "the effects of motions, perceptible or
hidden, subject to the dynamics of Lagrange", he alludes to a third variety of
foundational approach, quite distinct from Boscovich's, that Duhem believes can be
rendered observationally indistinguishable from his own approach.  The attempt to
reorganize mechanics that Duhem has in mind is associated particularly with
Heinrich Hertz but Duhem's discussion in fact tolerates a wider range of
alternatives that might also qualify as "observationally indistinguishable"
competitors.  I'll explain the details of this somewhat forgotten approach in due
course.
Before we do so, let us examine the problems of physical infinitesimals that
motivate the thesis of essential idealization.   We simply need to examine some of6
the usual ways in which the equations for the simplest possible classical
continuous system, a one-dimensional string or chain, get set up in the textbooks. 
And we don’t need to return to the primers of Duhem's time to find the problematic
expedients employed, for, with the notable exception of a rather sophisticated
efforts directed towards sophisticated engineers, modern textbooks dealing with
classical continua commonly replicate the old fashioned techniques (I consulted the
well-known text of Morse and Feshbach , among others, when I framed the sample7
treatment below).  For a more rigorous treatment, Stuart Antman's Non-linear
Problems of Elasticity can be cited.  With respect to the old-fashioned approaches,
Antman comments: 
most modern expositions...ask the reader to emulate the Red Queen by
believing six impossible things before breakfast.    8
So let's inspect some of the "impossible things" we are commonly asked to accept
in setting up the standard wave equation for a linear string. 
 Assume that we confront a hanging string that is pulled at its two boundaries
by a tension T.  For generality's sake, let's assume both that the string is moving
and that a variable gravitational force pulls upon the string (we can either allow the
string density or the applied field to be inhomogeneous).  What equations should
govern the string as a whole?  Call this question the global string problem. 
Following the familiar motto that "physics is simpler in the small", we hope to
resolve our global problem by first describing how the string looks "in the small." 
But how should "the small" of a continuously distributed string behave?  Let's first
assume in a naïve spirit that the "bodies" mentioned in Newton's laws of motion
can be treated as mathematical points.  In truth, it is rather hard to make sense of
Newton's laws if “body” is not read as "point."  For example, the Second law reads: 
Change of motion in a body is proportional to the force applied, and
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takes place in the direction of the straight line in which the force acts. 
If Newton intended a "body" to constitute something spread out, then the
description "the direction of the straight line in
which the force acts" becomes ill-defined; a
varying gravitational force might point in all sorts
of directions across the breadth of the "body" and
its sundry parts might respond by moving in
sundry distinct directions (albeit rarely in straight
lines since the "body" as a whole is welded
together).   So assume that we are looking at a
localized "point" within our string.  Let’s first
consider the situation when the "point" is at rest, so that its mass generates no
inertial reaction against movement.  The localized gravitational pull on our
specimen "point" must be completely balanced by the tensions in the string if the
string isn’t to move.  How does this equilibrium occur?  Well, the tension vector
that pulls the point on its left side, T  must point along the string's tangentleft
(otherwise the string would resist bending, which we postulate is not the case). 
Likewise, the tension to the right, T , must behave similarly except that it pulls inright
an opposing direction.  Let us now resolve these forces in the y-direction (= "up"),
providing us with resolved components T  and T .  Their vector sum  Ty y yleft right resultant
should represent the force balances the local downward gravitational pull ρ(x)g
(where ρ is the mass density of our "point").   Plainly, the components T  andyleft
T  must differ in magnitude, for otherwise their resultant would vanish,  If weyright
now permit our "point" to move, then Newton's second law (or d'Alembert's
principle) instructs us to add ρM y/Mt into our balance of "forces."  Strictly2 2 
speaking, this condition will only be applicable at the string’s lowest point for
elsewhere some of the gravitational pull will affect the endpoint tensions as well,
leading to the celebrated difficulties of the catenary.  To keep our discussion
simply, I will assume that our string is light enough that we can ignore these effects
(nothing material will hinge upon this simplification in what follows).
However, we are pretty clearly along to the road to incoherence: our "body"
was supposed to be a point, but somehow we have assigned distinct y-components
of a tension force T to its two "sides"?  Since the left and right hand pulls on a
point must be equal in magnitude and oppositely directed, doesn't the "resultant" of
T  and T  need to be 0?  How on earth does a point wind up possessingy yleft right
"sides" anyway?  
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Let us try a different approach.  Suppose we stretch out our "body" so that it
becomes "big enough" to possess distinct and clearly defined boundary points
(we'll leave it undetermined for the
moment whether this "bigger body" should
be regarded as finite in length or not).  We
might observe that a wide range of
terminology is used to denote the
"stretched out" arena we are now
considering: "element", "particle", "free
body diagram", and so forth.  Whatever we
call it, we must credit our "element" with a well-defined exterior "boundary"
because in continuum mechanics we must consider two kinds of "forces" that act in
rather different manners.  (1) There are "body" forces that pull upon the inside of a
"body" such as gravitation and magnetism.  Following d’Alembert’s principle, we
will also count the inertial acceleration ρM y/Mt  as a "body force" because it acts2 2 
inside the element, despite the fact that, strictly speaking, it shouldn't qualify as a
true "force" at all.  (2) However, there are also "surface" or "contact" forces that act
along the element's boundary, such as our two endpoint tensions T  and T . left right
Although commentators often overlook the point, the existence of these two
distinct kinds of force create all sorts of foundational headaches for continuum
mechanics that don't arise within Boscovichean "mass point" mechanics, simply
because only "body forces" appear in the latter (for Boscovicheans, mass point
surrogates for contact forces arise only as approximations to the actions of short
range molecular attractions).  In the case of our string, the notion of "boundary"
degenerates into the consideration of its two endpoints, but in an "element"
appropriate to a three-dimensional object, differing contact forces can push and
pull everywhere across the complete surface that encloses the element’s innards.  9
Normally, if one stretches something that is long enough to possess distinct
boundaries, its insides must enlarge as well.  As long as we pretended that our
string "body" is simply a dimensionless point, then the lack of room inside the
"point" leaves no ambiguity as to where the applied gravitational force and the
inertial reaction must act.  But after our "element" gets enlarged enough to carry
distinct contact tensions upon its two ends, it becomes quite unclear where inside
the element gravitation and inertial reaction are supposed to apply.   After all,
we’ve set up our string so that the gravitational pull is variable--shouldn't we see
that same variation across the breadth of our “element” as well?   In other words,
once we make our localized string "element" to be long enough to accept distinct
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end tensions, it should be long enough to accept a varying schedule of body forces
within its innards, each acting in slightly different locales?  Hso how will this
rather complicated arrangement behave?  A discouraging recognition now comes
to mind: hasn’t our original "global string problem" simply replicated itself as our
the "local string problem"?  Aren’t we once again asking, "What happens inside a
flexible stretch of string subject to variable forces when one pulls at its two ends?"
How does “Nature is simpler in the small” assist us if we witness no substantive
simplification in the problems we pose as we move inwards towards "the small"? 
We have turned a microscope upon a flea and discovered a hierarchy of smaller
fleas biting each other ad infinitum. 
Somehow we must find a way to render mechanical life inside our "element"
simpler than it is globally.  At this point, thoughts of the following sort were apt to
strike a nineteenth century mechanist:  "Gee, if we could only presume that our
little string element represented a rigid body, then our difficulties could be
resolved."  The Edwardian hydrodynamicist Horace Lamb wrote with respect to a
“chain” :10
The physical assumption which we make is that for equilibrium the
forces acting upon an infinitesimal element must fulfil the same
conditions as in the case of a rigid body.   11
As we saw, in such an "element", a weight ρ(x)g pulls on the interior of the
element while distinct tension forces pull on the left and right sides of the element
(we'll assume that the right side sits higher in the gravitational field).  A basic
proposition of rigid body statics (“the three moment theorem”) informs us that
such an element can remain at rest only if the three applied forces continue to
balance when moved to a common point.  If we can permissibly evoke Lamb's
"rigidification" principle, we can conclude that the two forces acting downward,
viz. ρ(x)g and T  must balance the upward pointing T , which allows us toy yleft right
express the magnitude of the latter in terms of the two lower forces.  Considering a
moving string without any gravitational contribution, we can evoke d’Alembert’s
principle to argue in like fashion that the unknown "inertial reaction" ρ M y/Mt  must2 2
balance the y-components of the two endpoint tensions, i.e., -T sin θ|  and T sinleft
θ|  respectively, where θ is the angle of the tangent to the x axis (we can assumeright
that the same total tension must pull at both endpoints given that we have assumed
that the gravitational contribution is small).   And if θ|  and θ|  are relativelyleft right
small, these magnitudes can be approximated as - T My/Mx|  and T y/Mx|left right
respectively.  Accordingly, as the size of our “element” shrinks towards zero, the
sum of these two tension forces will approach T M y/Mx  in the limit and we can2 2
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therefore regard this nonvanishing quantity as the proper "resultant" to balance the
inertial reaction within an infinitely small portion of our string.  In short, we obtain
T/ρ M y/Mx   = M y/Mt , which is the standard "wave equation" governing the small2 2 2 2
vibrations of a light string.  Arguing in this vein once again, we can add the
gravitational contribution ρ(x)g for a “light” string.
What I've just sketched is a standard rationale for the one-dimensional string
equation, more or less as it appears in many texts.   Clearly several "impossible12
things" have crept into our derivation.  Why should we assume that our boundary
points will move directly upwards, rather than sheering transversely?  "We assume
that the string is inextensible", goes the usual reply, but if that condition had
literally applied, the string would have been unable to move from its rest
configuration.  In any case, how can we possibly decompose the common tension
T into components on the left and right sides of our string element that differ in the
y direction but not in the x direction?  We'll consider how these "impossible
things" can be disentangled from the fully legitimate considerations that are also
registered within this rather muddled rationale for the usual string equation. 
Observe that the basic justification for our procedures rests upon the
assumption that, as one moves towards the small, the behavior of elements below
some indefinitely determined size scale begin to act like rigid bodies or, at least,
elements whose behavior can be fixed by a smaller (viz. finite) number of
parameters (this is the weaker assumption Duhem prefers).  Such claims are often
called rigidification assumptions--at some size scale, even thoroughly flexible
bodies can be approximated by rigidly "frozen" parts.  A.E.H. Love, one of the
great elasticians at the turn of the century, expresses a mass point version of
"freezing":
The necessity for a simplification arises from the fact that, in general,
all parts of a body have not the same motion, and the simplification
we make is to consider the motion of so small a portion of a body that
the differences between the motions of its parts are unimportant.  How
small the portion must be in order that this may be the case we cannot
say beforehand, but we avoid the difficulty thus arising by regarding it
as a geometrical point.  We think then in the first case of the motion of
a point.    13
In the context of Love's fuller text, it turns out that, although rigidified mass points
can serve as adequate “elements” for simple continua, more complicated
assemblies of linked rigid bodies may be needed.  Even in our string case, it is
sometimes common to find its basic "element" treated as three mass points linked
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together by "weightless strings."  Such texts commonly evoke the venerable
principle of virtual work to determine the “element”’s behavior, where an "virtual
displacement" δy  is introduced at the central mass point p pulling it slightlyp
upwards or downwards.  This little pull on p will induce corresponding endpoint
displacements δy  and δy , whichleft right
will cause the endpoint tensions Tyleft
and T  to perform a certain degreeyright
of “virtual work”, measured by the
product F δy.  Our principle declares
that the sum of these "virtual works"
must vanish near equilibrium, from
which we can once again calculate the magnitudes of T  and T  from ρ(x)g. y yleft right
Once this basic static balance of forces has been established, the usual procedure is
to once again to “turn on” the inertial reaction ρM y/Mt  through appeal to2 2
d'Alembert's principle (I have sketched such a "virtual work" approach to
mechanical “elements” largely because Duhem himself favors a treatment of this
type, asi t most readily generalizes to a thermomechanical setting). 
We might observe that if we simply replace the phrase "pair of weightless
strings" in the previous paragraph by "pair of strong attractive forces acting at a
nearby distance", the previous derivation can look as if it describes a setup that
conforms perfectly to a Boscovichean ontology involving mass points and action-
at-a-distance forces only.   In fact, treatments of continuum “elements” that14
decompose them into alleged “point masses” can be encountered in a fair number
of textbooks as well.  The seeming equivalence of all of these diverse treatments
encourages the sentiment, prevalent within the late classical era, that ontological
scruples don't much matter once one has moved inside the special preserve of a
material "element." 
For our purposes, the most salient feature of these procedures is that they
make the physics of continuous media follow a rather strange logic, for it seems
that we cannot set up the proper equations for a continuous body unless we
intentionally misdescribe its flexible substance, at some small size scale, as more
rigid (or mass point-like) than it really is.  The only way we can arrest an otherwise
fruitless descent into the labyrinth of the continuum is to move our discussion
artificially into a simpler landscape in the “small” consisting of mass points or
assemblies of rigid bodies.  The nearly universal employment of this strange
methodology in the Victorian era has caused many modern commentators to
misunderstand the basic physical ontology they largely accept.  Very rarely do
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authors of the period straightforwardly agree with Boscovich that, at root,
everything is genuinely composed of mass points or even rigid bodies.  Whatever
the exact nature of molecules, spectroscopy had empirically established that were
capable of jiggling in the manners characteristic of strings, bells and other classical
continua--they did not stay rigidly mute.   Nonetheless, as we’ve just seen, it15
seemed as if continuous media can't be coherently described from a
methodological point of view unless we first assign them unrealistic substructures
consisting of rigid parts as mediating elements.  For this reason, most late
nineteenth century mechanics primers begin by articulating its "fundamental laws"
in a form that directly applies only to mass points and/or rigid bodies. 
Nonetheless, we should not understand the fundamental "ontology" of that
textbook's universe to be constituted by the apparent subjects of those opening
laws. 
One can quite a bit of "anti-realist" sentiment expressed by a wide range of
Victorian physicists.  Much of this, it seems to me, trace to the foundational
difficulties I have just sketched.  In particular, such thinking encourages a belief in
the general thesis that I called the unavoidability of essential idealization earlier:
physics cannot approach the physical world without first introducing some
interceding layer of false--or "idealized"--misdescription.   The statistician Karl
Pearson, who began his scientific career as an elastician, includes the ensuing brief
for scientific antirealism in his influential The Grammar of Science:
I feel quite sure that to assert the real existence in the world of
phenomena of all the concepts by aid of which we describe
phenomena--molecule, atom, prime-atom--even if [they be admitted]
ad infinitum, will not save us from having to consider the moving
thing [we utilize in our mathematical treatments] to be a geometrical
ideal, from having to postulate [a fictitious entity which] is contrary
to our perceptual experience [of a continuous world].   16
As such, "essential idealization" represents a radical philosophical thesis that
should be sharply distinguished from the humdrum observation that physicists
often study unrealistic models of phenomena for practical convenience--say, when
we run molecular modelings involving only a hundred molecules or when we
model a natural shape by a perfect circle.  Clearly, the assumption that the strange
“replace by rigid elements” methodology we have canvassed must be followed in
dealing with continuous media will encourage belief in the essential idealization
thesis, whereas a straightforward Boscovitchian needn't see any "idealization"
involved in her version of classical physics beyond the humdrum simplifications
we introduce for practical purposes.   One may personally dislike mass points, but
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they don’t qualify as “idealized” from a Boscovichian point of view.  However,
once we decide that a successful continuum physics must appeal to essential
idealization to get its enterprises under way, we have good reason to doubt that
science attempts to paint a straightforwardly realistic portrait of reality, for how
can we explain the rigidified “fictions” that keep intervening in the stories we
weave?   Worse yet, the variety of “idealized element” stories we have canvassed
seem rather indifferent to whether its innards string should be comprised of points,
rigid bodies or other simplified arrangements.  Accordingly, while a true
Boscovichian needn't be tempted into anti-realism as a scientific philosophy, the
Victorian advocate of continuous media were likely to find such a point of view
methodologically unavoidable.  
The role that essential (as opposed to “practical”) idealization plays in this
line of thought is crucial: mere “idealization” for convenience’s sake needn’t force
one into any kind of radical philosophy at all.  Unfortunately, these simple
distinctions in categories of “idealization” are often entirely muddled within
present day philosophical discussion.  Too many contemporary writers are content
simply to peek into a physics textbook and exclaim, "Ah, ha!; perfect circles and
frictionless planes--ergo the Victorians were right to declare that the aim of physics
is not to describe reality."  But it is impossible to conduct a sensible discussion of
"scientific realism" unless one better distinguishes the precise vein of
“idealization” one has in mind.
Fortunately for scientific realists, twentieth century investigations into
continuum physics have demonstrated that the physics of such media can--and,
moreover, must!--be set up without passing through any strange intermediate stage
of rigidifying idealization.  I’ll return to the morals we might extract from this
discovery later in the essay. 
(iii)
 After these lengthy “physical infinitesimal” preliminaries, let's return to
Duhem’s suggested example of distinct theories that seem equally compatible with
exactly the same evidence.   As we noted in passing, Duhem's own approach to
continuous media required simplified “elements” but he allowed these to manifest
other localized qualities than the traditional mechanical choices we utilized above. 
Specifically, in his own version of element “virtual work” he tolerated primitive
"conjugate pairs" of quantities that represent inherently thermodynamic forms of
"work", such as T δS (where T is temperature and S is entropy) or µ δn (where µ is
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cyclic coordinate
a chemical potential for some compound and n is its concentration).   A17
“mechanist,” in contrast, will attempt to get by with just the variations familiar
from mechanical tradition--F δy (as witnessed above in the string example) and T
δθ (where T is a torque and θ a rotation).   In other words, an element "free body
diagram" for Duhem is allowed to be more "abstractly specified" (his term) in its
behaviors than strict mechanists permit.  Despite this enlarged,
“thermomechanical” toleration of a wider range of “element” behaviors, Duhem
must still appeal to essential idealization to get his continuum physics under way. 
That is, while he believes that any portion of a macroscopic continuous material
will display infinitely many degrees of freedom, the adjustments possible within a
Duhemian "element" must be restricted to a finite set (in engineering jargon, we
must "lump" the distributed variables displayed at the macroscopic level to frame a
finite set of parameters within the “element”).  This continued assumption of
essential idealization will prove critical in what follows.
It is at this stage that Hertz’ peculiar form of
mechanics enters the picture as a potential
“observationally equivalent” competitor.  Following
observations made earlier by Routh, Helmholtz and J.
Thompson, Hertz studied the effects on a mechanical
system if some subset of its quantities turned out to be
cyclic--that is, their spatial positions do not effect the
total energy of the complete system.  An example:
consider the spinning ring within a gyroscope.  As soon
as one "particle" within the ring rotates out of its present
position, its place is immediately filled by some identical
neighbor.  For all intents and purposes, the overall
behavior of the gyroscope as a whole will prove utterly
indifferent to the positions of the ring's particles, although the gyroscope's overall
movements will be drastically influenced by the angular velocity whereby the ring
elements displace one another.  Hence the formal definition of a "cyclic variable":
a quantity whose velocities but not positions appear in a Lagrangian suitable for the
composite system.  If we are unable to observe the insides of our gyroscope
directly--say, the gizmo comes encased within an opaque box--, the internal
whirling will seem to supply a hidden source of potential energy that makes the
box harder to move than it would otherwise prove.  Without opening the box, we
can’t tell whether its resistence to movement is caused by some novel external
force field or simply due to its hidden gyroscopic whirling.   In other words, the
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unseen "hidden motions" of the gyroscope’s cyclic quantities display a remarkable
capacity to imitate the behavior of an externalized force potential.
And we can generalize this observation further.  Let us set up some puppet
on the exterior of our box that is mechanically linked to
the gyroscope inside.  We find it hard to move the
puppet.  Is this because a resisting force has been
created inside the box (from a stretched spring, say) or
merely because we have mechanically sped up the
gyroscope’s cyclic motion?  Again, without opening
the box, we can’t tell--the two effects are perfect
mimics of one another. 
Behind these observations lie a number of
general theorems on cyclic coordinates that Hertz
exploited in setting up his mechanics.  He first argued
that all standard Newtonian "action at a distance"
forces  can be adequately imitated by positing suitable18
hidden cyclic elements.  The advantage of this
reduction is that one might then maintain that any “active force” one observes is
really the result of a change in how various hidden mechanical elements presently
whirl (historically, Descartes also argued that all surface “potential” effects
represent the products of hidden kinetic notions).  As a result, the only “forces”
that basic mechanics need consider are the entirely "reactive" contact forces
associated with geometrical constraints in traditional mechanical parlance (that is,
the “forces” that keep mechanical pieces linked together).  Often Hertz’ program is
loosely described as "doing without forces"--the strategy is better described as one
of “making do with only constraint forces.”  
From Duhem's richer point of view, such techniques pose a considerable
challenge: isn't it possible that any of Duhem's intrinsically thermodynamic forms
of potential (say, the chemical potential µ) might be imitated at a smaller size scale
by setting up hidden elements at a level smaller than where Duhem has chosen to
"freeze" his element level of description?  Can’t Hertz fairly boast to Duhem:
"Anything you can do, I can do smaller"?   Or, to quote Duhem’s own words once
again, isn’t “it ... always permissible to pretend that these phenomena are the
effects of motions, perceptible or hidden, subject to the dynamics of Lagrange?” 
But the stories Duhem and Hertz tell of how continuous bodies are composed
appear completelt different ontologically: in the former’s case, we find temperature
and chemical activity arising at every size level, whereas in Hertz’ world,
everything devolves into atomic gyroscopes at some minute scale length.  Unless
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we can open up the box, how can we tell which view is correct?  On a macroscopic
level, each setup imitates the other perfectly.
Well, to a hard bitten scientific realist such considerations alone won’t seem
completely upsetting: it is easy to supply historical cases of competing theories that
can’t be distinguished as long as suitable technology is lacking, e.g., an accelerator
capable of shooting suitable probes into the innards of our materials.  After a point,
such probes will bounce back quite differently from a set of Hertzian molecules
than from a Duhemian continuum.   Here, as I see it, is where a tacit assumption19
of “essential idealization” enters the picture.  We can now rephrase the Hertz
versus Duhem debate as a question of “How should fundamental mechanics select
its basic ‘elements’--should they be restricted to Hertz’s limited palette of
quantities or decked out in Duhem’s richer array?”  Once again, Hertz can crow to
Duhem, “any ‘element’ of yours I can model smaller.”  But now there is no longer
any question of resolving this new dispute by empirical probes; the need for
essential idealization at the “element” level provides endless lower chambers in
which Hertz and Duhem can permanently hide from any conceivable form of
empirical disconfirmation. 
But, as long as these divergent alternatives remain equally open, the
contours of future research into continuous media will be greatly affected by the
choice one selects.  The Duhemian is content to frame her modelings in rich,
thermomechanical colors whereas the Hertzian mechanist will spend much time
constructing dour gyroscopic imitators of the Duhemian successes at a lower size
scale.  Duhemians regard the latter activities as a distracting waste of time, but
“observational equivalence” of the two approaches shows that they cannot produce
irrevocably empirical grounds for discouraging the Hertzians.  This line of
thought, in my opinion, captures some of the deeper reasons why Duhem believed
that “taste” in the fundamentals of a physical theory ultimately represents a matter
of “metaphysics” rather than empirics. 
I should like to stress that Duhem’s discussion in The Evolution of
Mechanics of mechanist competitors such as Hertz ' program do not explicitly
evoke the funny role that "essential idealizations" play within most nineteenth
century approaches to continua.  The conflict is presented simply as a dispute
between those scientists who favor modeling a material simply with a finite
number of thermodynamic parameters and those who prefer to seek a large (but
finite) number of hidden parts, characterized entirely by mechanical qualities.  The
thesis of “essential idealization” was simply incorporated in their everyday
mathematical manipulation of “infinitesimals” and did not warrant explicit
mention, except in exceptional circumstances such as Pearson’s The Grammar of
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Science.  Nonetheless, I think its tacit presence helps explain why a figure like
Duhem would have found the Hertz/thermomechanics debate irresolvable by
empirical means.  
There are some additional considerations that help explain Duhem’s point of
view better.  Anyone who works in the thermomechanics tradition recognizes that
the “models” she builds are likely to only encode only averaged material qualities
in her “element” choices.  Given his researches, Duhem was very much aware that
the macroscopic properties of a material like steel are deeply affected by the way in
which its different component phases form into grains--from his point of view, a
block of steel represents a complex conglomerate of smaller portions of purer
forms of grain-sized continuous material.  Nonetheless, metallurgists have set up
“averaged” equations for steels that are quite satisfactory for most macroscopic
practical purposes.  In fact, the infinitesimal “elements” for these equations are
nicely simplified because a steel acts nicely isotropic at a large scale (because the
different orientations of the individual grain cancel out one another).  To be sure,
for other purposes, our metallurgists will need to consider the steel in its fully
grained glory, where each individual grain will require a different choice of
infinitesimal “element” to capture its local (and, generally, non-isotropic)
behaviors.  And Duhem would have also had good reason to suspect that even
individual grains will eventually require their own granular treatments under a
certain regimes of probing.  Therefore the philosophy of the thermomechanical
modeler is always to adopt the simplest infinitesimal “element” sufficient for the
practical questions at hand.
If so, why should Duhem strongly recommend that, nonetheless, at every
level of analysis, the generous thermomechanical configuration of qualities will
prove the best frame to adopt?   In fact, he was quite aware of the deep
considerations about the behavior of materials that require thermodynamic notions
like entropy to resolve the evolving behavior of shock waves as they form within a
hammered steel block (Duhem was a specialist in this subject, inter alia).   In other20
words, most Hertzian mediums, considered at scale size A, must eventually appeal
to entropy et al. to resolve their evolving behaviors at that size scale.  The only
way that a true-hearted mechanist can preserve her favored point of view is to
claim that, at some much smaller scale B, “hidden motions” account for entropy’s
apparent handiwork at scale size A.   In my opinion, few accounts of the “anti-
atomist” debates of the late nineteenth century take account of this important
“mechanical quantities alone cannot serve as an adequately closed basis for
mechanics” theme.   Some of the reason this theme has not been adequately noticed




Fortunately for scientific realism’s sake, modern studies have shown that the
presumption that a level of idealization is required for classical continua simply
represents a mistake that arises from nineteenth century attempts to perform
distinct mathematical chores at the same time.  Stuart Antman remarks:
In the early 1950's, [Clifford] Truesdell began a critical examination
of the foundations of continuum thermomechanics in which the roles
of geometry, fundamental law, and constitutive hypotheses were
clarified and separated from the unsystematic approximation then and
still prevalent in parts of the subject.   21
What this means in our string example is the following.  When we assumed
rigidification within our "element", we were simultaneously attempting to (1)
define local quantities suitable for describing any continua;  (2) articulate plausible
constitutive relationships for those local quantities; (3) approximating the
relationships given (2) through appeal to known macroscopic knowledge of the
material’s apparent symmetries (or near symmetries).  With respect to task (1), we
used the rigidification to both justify and locate a non-zero "resultant force"
T  stemming from the endpoint tensions that could be regarded as actingyresultant
inside the “element” at the same very same string point as the body forces and the
inertial reaction.  In a modern treatment, one argues, through appeal to basic
balance equations formulated as integral equations over extended bodies (not
points), that objects like T  generally (but not always) exist locally, althoughyresultant
this "local object" turns out to not really be a force, but something sui generis, viz.
a stress tensor (the conceptual differences get masked in the case through the drop
in dimensionality from three to one ).  The argument for this tensor stems from a22
fairly straightforward limit argument--indeed, one that was originally suggested by
Cauchy himself--which does not require any appeal to infinitesimals (although, of
course, Cauchy's reasoning can be replicated within a nonstandard analysis
framework as well).  Likewise, purely geometrical considerations dictate that local
geometrical qualities like the string curvature M y/Mx generally exist, although,2 2 
once again, these properly represent forms of strain tensor.  But, at this stage, we
should not rush to connect T  up with T M y/Mx  through the somewhat hokeyy 2 2resultant
geometrical arguments that employed in the stock setups we surveyed above. 
Instead, we must describe, in the form of a new “constitutive equation” law, the
manner in which force-related stress relates to geometry-related strain in the metal
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comprising the string.  "Hooke's law" is best known of these "constitutive
equation” hypotheses and serves to ground our string derivation in a better way. 
quite adequately.  In fact, the main reason that engineers needed to disentangle
such constitutive assumptions from the geometrical reasonings listed under (1) is
they couldn’t work their ways to reasonable setups for complex materials like
rubbers and paints otherwise.  The very fact that most textbook derivations of the
string equation such as we surveyed act as if everything follows from the geometry
of the situation alone and that no constitutive assumptions are needed represents a
sure symptom that matters have gone conceptually astray.  In any case, utilizing the
recommended modern docket of ingredients, we can write down a suitable
equation to govern our string without requiring any belief in "impossible things"
along the way.  The hope that "physics will simplify in the small" becomes neatly
realized in this alternative program through the employment of straightforward
limiting arguments and no intermediate stage of essential idealization is required. 
Although we have now managed to get to the breakfast table without
needing to swallow impossibilities, we are likley to find some rather formidable
nonlinear equations sitting on our plate-- equations that, even today, are very
difficult to handle (if we ever become inclined to patronize the Victorians for their
sloppy derivational practices, we should remember that, without their ameliorating
assumptions, a rather nasty equation directly emerges as the "simplest" possible
form of classical continuum description).   To obtain a more tractable mathematics,
we must typically find ways to exploit our prior knowledge of how vibrating
strings behave to uncover approximation recipes that produce simpler equations
(like the linearized wave equation we studied) that roughly imitate string behavior
to a reasonable degree.  In the modern approach, these stage (3) assumptions come
after a more exact but intractable equation has been derived, so that the accuracy of
our approximating substitute can be appropriately gauged.  It is only at this stage
that we are allowed to exploit the "unsystematic assumptions" of days gone by: that
that the points on a string mainly wiggle in the y-direction; that they do not make a
large slope with the x-axis and so forth.   As we saw, in the old derivations, such
approximations get made from the outset and can’t be easily disentangled from
moves appropriate to stages (1) and (2).   Utilizing these approximating
assumptions wisely, we can struggle along a more or less plausible path that leads
back to our old friend, T/ρ M y/Mx   = M y/Mt , although, in truth, a rigorous2 2 2 2
mathematical justification for all of the corners we need to trim remains a
somewhat elusive manner.   From this point of view, the Victorians (and their23
modern imitators) erred in regularly blending sound physical principle with rather
uncontrolled approximation techniques.  Of course, given the derivational ordeals
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that a more virtuous path requires, it is perfectly understandable why they would
have believed that essential idealization represented a basic condition of scientific
life.
But the true lesson of this history is that sometimes greater patience is
wanted.  In the fullness of time the coherent rationale that lies tangled up behind
the surface veneer of a strange physical derivation often requires a good deal of
careful investigation before its contours become evident (“Logic is eternal,
Heaviside advises, “it can wait”).  In retrospect, the thesis of essential idealization
simply served as a convenient crutch that allowed the Victorians to stumble past
some rather ferocious conceptual obstacles.  That fact may justify the principle as
an expedient, but not as a sound philosophical stance. 
(v)
To summarize: (1) In the late classical period, anti-realism and its cousin, the
thesis of essential idealization, emerged from the understandable methodological
difficulties that arise when physicists attempted to apply the tools of prior
mechanical tradition directly to continua.  (2) As such, these two philosophical
doctrines served the practical purpose of rationalizing mathematical transitions
that, in hindsight, are better treated by segregating approximation techniques
cleanly from fundamental physical principle.  (3) Many allied doctrines
commonally defended within philosophy of science today--we specifically
considered the observational underdetermination of theories-- were also originally
motivated by this same forgotten problematic.  (4) The apparent need to handle
physical infinitesimals in an essential idealization manner led thinkers like Duhem
to conclude that many distinct approaches to mechanics could never be
distinguished on empirical grounds.  It was this observation that seems to have
inspired his version of the famous Quine-Duhem thesis.  
As noted earlier, many contemporary anti-realists still cite Duhem’s The
Aim and Structure of Physical Theory in support of their own favored themes.  The
largely forgotten history surveyed in this essay indicates that, in a very real sense,
modern philosophy remains haunted by the ghosts of departed infinitesimals.  
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This essay was composed a 2001 Central A.P.A. symposium on physics’1 
interactions with philosophy which also featured Michael Friedman and Mathias
Frisch.  I’d like to thank them both as well as Michael Liston for helpful
comments. (Note added June, 2007).  
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